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Abstract 
From its inception, EU law has been organised with (economic) integration as its 
guiding paradigm. A public-private distinction as it is known in many civil law 
countries has never been a characterising feature of EU law. In the absence of such 
a divide in EU law, the public and the private sphere interact differently. First, the 
attempt to strike a balance between the state and the market reflects the struggle 
for a delineation between public and private power. Second, the evolution of the 
personal scope of EU internal market law and fundamental rights increasingly 
involves private parties at both sides. Third, the emergence of European contract 
law has led to conceptual clashes between the international trade law paradigm and 
the public-private distinction in the tradition of civil law countries. It will be argued 
that EU law scholarship and legal practice will have to re-conceptualise the role of 
the individual and private parties as subjects of the law, bearers of rights and 
addressees of obligations in order to flesh out what is known as the private law 
element in many national legal cultures. 
Key words 
European Union law; evolution of European Union law; public-private distinction; 
role of private parties in European Union law. 
Resumen 
Desde su creación, la legislación de la Unión Europea (UE) se ha organizado en 
base al paradigma orientador de la integración (económica). La legislación 
comunitaria nunca se ha caracterizado por una distinción público-privada como la 
existente en el derecho civil de numerosos países. Ante la ausencia de esta división 
en la legislación de la UE, la esfera pública y la privada interactúan de forma 
indiferente. En primer lugar, el intento de lograr un equilibrio entre el Estado y el 
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mercado refleja la lucha por una delimitación entre el poder público y el privado. En 
segundo lugar, la evolución del alcance privado de la legislación sobre el mercado 
interno europeo y los derechos fundamentales hace que se impliquen cada vez más 
poderes privados en ambas partes. En tercer lugar, el surgimiento del derecho 
contractual europeo ha dado lugar a conflictos conceptuales entre el paradigma de 
derecho mercantil internacional y la distinción público-privada en la tradición del 
derecho civil de los países. Se argumentará que la comunidad científica de la UE en 
materia legislativa y la práctica jurídica tendrán que replantearse el papel de los 
entes individuales y privados como sujetos de derecho, portadores de derechos y 
obligaciones, con el fin de profundizar en lo que se conoce como el elemento del 
derecho privado en muchas culturas jurídicas nacionales. 
Palabras clave 
Derecho de la Unión Europea; evolución del derecho de la Unión Europea; distinción 
público-privado; sector privado en el derecho de la Unión Europea. 
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1. Introduction 
Conventional wisdom argues that the European Union (EU) legal order is by nature 
an incomplete and dynamic one. If we look at the focal points in the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) during the first decade of the 21st 
century, we not only observe a tremendous number of cases situated in the area of 
freedom, security and justice, but also an increasing number of cases involving 
contractual relations, in other words, the nucleus of what is generally referred to as 
“private law” at a national level. Whereas the major concerns in the early days of 
European integration essentially involved the interplay between national and 
supranational law and the establishment, shaping and strengthening of what is 
traditionally called “public” authority at a supranational level, it is currently the role 
of horizontal relationships, i.e. legal relationships between private parties, which 
increasingly draw our attention. 
Whether one deals with legislation, case law, academic drafts for future legislation 
or other model laws, all different sorts of principles or international instruments 
with varying degrees of binding and mandatory character, many of these sources 
and instruments affect or directly involve what the received wisdom in Europe 
assigns to the field of “private law”. This applies, for instance, to the recent 
legislative activities in consumer protection (European Commission 2008a) and in 
anti-discrimination law (European Commission 2008c), the controversial expansion 
of (general) principles of EU law into areas such as contract law (CJEU, Case 
412/06, Hamilton [2008] ECR I-02383; CJEU, Case 489/07, Messner [2009] ECR I-
07315), labour law (CJEU, Case 144/05, Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-
998; CJEU, Case 555/07, Kücükdeveci [2009] ECR I-4529) and company law 
(CJEU, Case 101/08, Audiolux [2009] ECR I-09823) or the future of the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference and related projects. Furthermore, non-binding 
instruments in the field of labour relations, social protection or commercial relations 
rooted in regional or international cooperation loom large in practice. 
Against this backdrop, it seems worthwhile to take a closer look at what the terms 
“public” and “private”, which we have so far used a little carelessly, actually mean. 
To begin with, I will briefly consider several viewpoints such as the analytical, a 
selective historical, and equally selective comparative perspective that may inform 
those terms and their distinction (2.1.-2.3.). Subsequently, I will address the 
question of whether there is a public-private distinction in EU law or, in the absence 
thereof, how both spheres interact otherwise (3.). A brief survey of where the 
terms “public” and “private” are used in the Treaties will remain inconclusive with 
respect to their meaning and conception (3.1.). This is owed to the fact that from 
the beginning, the Treaties and secondary legislation were organised with economic 
integration as the guiding paradigm (3.2.). This feature is still underlying today’s 
EU legal order even though the economic integration paradigm is in urgent need of 
being complemented by conceptually sound non-market objectives and contractual 
relations, and ultimately replaced by a comprehensive constitutional approach. 
Three aspects are of utmost importance in this context: First, we will look at the 
familiar interplay between the state and the market in selected fields, i.e. scrutinise 
the impact of the powers held by Member States and private parties in the internal 
market involving their commercial and the public interest (3.3.). No longer focusing 
on the interplay between public and private power in the light of the market rules, 
we will then in a second step shift the focus to the subjects of EU law and the legal 
relationships between them. In this context, the evolution from inter-state relations 
via the vertical applicability of EU law to its applicability in horizontal relationships 
will be sketched out briefly (3.4). A field of interest of increasing significance with 
respect to the public-private distinction in EU law is the attempt to accommodate 
horizontal contractual relations within the EU legal framework at the substantive 
and procedural level (3.5.). Third, and in connection to the former, we will raise the 
question of how emerging EU private law can be adapted to the EU law acquis in a 
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meaningful manner against the backdrop of some heated debates concerning the 
legislative powers of the EU and the interplay between freedom and solidarity.  
It will hopefully become obvious that the expansion of the EU legal order at the 
level of subject-matter cannot leave the role of its actors and subjects unaffected. 
EU law scholarship and legal practice will have to re-conceptualise the role of the 
individual as a subject of the law and a bearer of rights and an addressee of 
obligations. Hence, one must overcome the image of the individual as a law 
enforcement tool by taking an actor-based approach. Moreover, EU law is in urgent 
need of accommodating hybrid forms of governance, involving both the market and 
the state, and outlining the concept of the “public” interest. 
2. Terms and concepts: the public and the private element in law 
To rely on concepts without defining them often produces confusion, yet adequately 
defining them is a complicated task. Assigning any particular meaning to a term 
such as “public” or “private” law does not exclude necessarily any other meaning 
that other observers may put forward. The terms “private” law and “civil” (derived 
from the Roman citizen “civis” as opposed to the laws governing foreign peoples) 
law are used interchangeably in the present paper. Any definition that denotes the 
“public” or the “private” remains the reflection of a personal and, hence, subjective 
preference unless it is incorporated into the law in an authoritative manner. The 
role of any other more or less meaningful and mindfully used definition is 
unavoidably confined to that of a heuristic device. Hence, the theories underlying 
certain historical or contemporary concepts of what should be considered private 
and what public law cannot provide more than a toolbox if they are not given 
normative force. This applies even more at the EU level because due to the 
divergent forms of using those terms in different national contexts, a universally 
applicable definition of what is public and what is private law across legal orders 
proves difficult from the outset. The reliance on functional and autonomous terms 
and concepts that ensure a uniform application of the law helps to overcome this 
difficulty. 
What matters ultimately is who defines those concepts, and in particular whether 
the defining body has the power to do this authoritatively or simply as an 
expression of a view that may be influential as a matter of fact, but lacks 
immediate legal consequences. Expressions of views of that kind frequently include 
scholarly opinions or a kind of “soft law” or policy documents that are voiced, 
criticised, reconsidered and modified over time. The delineation of concepts always 
includes value judgments so that it is of utmost importance to distinguish the 
authoritative accounts from the merely informative and persuasive accounts of 
public and private law. 
2.1. Analytical: The reference points and criteria underpinning the distinction 
The concepts of public and private law can be built upon various reference points: 
First, the legal nature of a given actor could serve as a reference point for the 
activities that he or she carries out. Hence, the classification of activities follows the 
legal nature of the respective actor, which amounts to a formal institutional 
concept. To give an example, according to this classification, the activities of a 
company incorporated under private law would generally be assigned to the realm 
of private law whereas actions carried out by a police officer whose legal status is 
governed by public law would be qualified as acts of public law. This view 
presupposes however that the realms of private and public law that underlie the 
classification of the actor are well-defined and severed from one another. It merely 
classifies the activities carried out by the respective institutions and bodies on the 
basis of that premise and regards all such classified acts as a homogeneous group. 
Second, an act can be designated and categorised according to whether the form of 
action amounts to a typical instrument originating in the private sphere (such as a 
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contract) or rather in the public realm (such as legislation and the adoption of 
general and abstract rules as an emanation of public authority). This approach can 
be problematic, because the assessment of when something is typical presupposes 
a classification such that the value judgments underlying the distinction between 
the public and the private sphere would be taken for granted and hence simply 
shifted elsewhere. 
Thirdly, the realm of public and private law can further be separated along the lines 
of the object of the legal relations. Accordingly, conventional wisdom tends to 
assign health care services or the care of the elderly to the public good rather than 
to the public sphere, and the construction of buildings is assigned to the private 
one. Here again, the choice that is intuitively made rests on assumptions that are 
based on premises that themselves require a justification. 
Fourthly, and slightly distinct, situations could be classified as public or private 
according to the objective and functions of the respective legal relations. Hence, a 
distinction could be made between legal relations the goal of which goes beyond 
the needs of the parties involved such as the care of the elderly (in which the state 
also has an interest) and other legal relations that merely aim to serve the interests 
of the parties involved which seems to hold true for an ordinary commercial 
contract. Here again, value judgments about the extent to which each of these is 
intended to be in the public interest or discussion on what is the relationship 
between means and ends or between immediate and long term goals are inevitable 
and merely shifted elsewhere.  
Fifthly and lastly, the public and the private sphere and at the same time public and 
private law can be distinguished according to whether the underlying legal relations 
are based upon voluntary acts or rather coercion. Even though this distinction may 
not be as circular as the ones previously mentioned with regard to the attributes 
“private” and “public”, clarification is required as to what is “voluntary” or 
“coercive” legally speaking. Coercion can result from the threat of formally 
established pecuniary or non-pecuniary sanctions as well as from pressure as a 
matter of fact, not law – which presents problems as to how to grasp and measure 
it. Again, this distinction suffers from the defect of failing to provide unambiguous 
criteria clearly delineating between the two. 
No matter which reference point, and hence reading of the public-private 
distinction, is preferred, it has hopefully become apparent that the ultimate criteria 
of these distinctions have to be fleshed out and justified in different contexts. What 
these reference points and readings are ultimately all about is seeking criteria from 
which we can determine the applicable law. These different reference points and 
readings may be relied on cumulatively or exclusively. They may apply at the level 
of substance or with respect to the applicable area of court jurisdiction or court 
procedure. What one can derive from this section, in any event, is that there are 
several reference points and criteria that may inform a formal distinction and ideally 
need to be unpacked. 
2.2. Historical 
The following section will sketch out the evolution of a classical vision advancing a 
simplistic and reductionist delineation of public and private law before this 
distinction as such and its viability in light of the impact of (changing) social and 
economic realities on the law will be questioned. Even if the origin of a distinction 
between private and public law can be traced to Roman law, the beginnings of a 
more consistent body of private law or public law did not develop until the 18th 
century. It will be impossible to describe the overall evolution as a uniform 
development, neither with respect to what today is a single state nor with respect 
to Europe as such never mind the Western world at large. The scope of the present 
paper takes a Eurocentric perspective and tries to offer a simplified account of the 
distinction between public and private law throughout Europe or the absence of 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 4 (2012) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 30 
Constanze Semmelmann  Theoretical Reflections on the Public-Private… 
such a distinction (Freedland and Auby 2006; Jansen and Michaels 2007; Dagan 
2008; Ruffert 2009, Micklitz 2011) although the figures and indications of dates 
may be very rough. 
The divide had already been formulated by Roman lawyers without being a 
conceptually clear-cut idea, and it remained so without considerable political 
implications. The study of law was divided into two branches; that of public and 
that of private law. Public law was that which regarded the government of the 
Roman State; private law was that which concerned the interests of the individuals 
(Ulpian, 1.1.4, later codified by Justinian, 1.1.1.2). It was not, however, until the 
Middle Ages that a framework of private law emerged in Europe. Private law 
developed on the basis of Roman law, ecclesiastical, feudal, local and commercial 
law and custom that was oftentimes applied in a pluralist manner. Natural law, 
liberalism and rationalism evolved and culminated in the founding of nation-states 
in many parts of Europe from the end of the 18th century and in the secularisation 
of authority. Characterised by rationalism and other values linked to enlightenment, 
private law was reformulated in continental Europe as an expression of the 
sovereign states and their new-born codifications, i.e. its existence began to 
depend on state authority In contrast, common law’s legal validity was considered 
independent of the state, yet found and later created by courts that derived their 
authority from the King in England. Even though the courts had become part of the 
centralised administration of the state (in England, of the Crown), they retained a 
strong collective professional identity and independence from the political 
government. The USA rejected the sovereignty of the English Crown and also the 
need to base the authority of the common law on the abstract idea of the state. 
Rather, its validity was derived from the people and formulated by the courts as its 
representatives. Classical liberalism and the protection of individual rights and 
equality was postulated beginning in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe and the 
US, guaranteeing citizens in a bourgeois society a sphere without state interference 
where they could pursue their own (commercial) interests. In particular on the 
European continent, the state thus came to be considered as somewhat 
antagonistic vis-à-vis the individual and civil society. Contract, property and tort 
law influenced the relationships between individuals, whereas the parties of a 
contract were conceived of as bearers of equal status. Justice was understood as 
commutative rather than distributive. Legal relations were characterised by the 
creation of rights and obligations by virtue of voluntary acts such as contracts and 
obligations of reparations based on reciprocity or correlativity. The interaction 
between supply and demand was supposed to lead to the functioning of the market 
by virtue of the well-known “invisible hand” argument of Adam Smith. 
Concerning what came to be known as the public side, an important change paved 
the way for the emergence of public law: So long as authority was intimately linked 
to the religious or secular ruler of a given territory, no public element could 
emerge. It was only when sovereign nation-states emerged on the European 
continent from fervid battles for civic virtues and values, a collective public interest 
was shaped that was divorced from transcendental authority or the ruling person as 
such. This was due to the tenets of natural law, liberalism and the evolution of 
universal human rights that brought about liberties and equality rights which could 
be invoked against political power from the emerging states. Not only did the new-
born nation-states foster the codification of private law, but some of them, such as 
France and Spain, also contributed to the emergence of a highly sophisticated 
administrative law. Consequently, the states were regarded as clearly distinct from 
civil society, and the public interest came to be associated with the common good 
(the definition of which is obviously open to debate). The states’ activities had to be 
based on specific unilateral powers leading to vertical relationships of 
subordination. The state and its officials’ democratic legitimacy was grounded in, 
and ensured by, accountability requirements, increasingly enforced, in certain 
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cultures by means of judicial review. Public law therefore appeared as the 
prolongation of politics. 
The public-private distinction was consolidated and was at the same time and 
somewhat paradoxically exposed to changing social and economic realities 
triggered by the industrialisation and technical progress in the 19th century. 
Classical liberal contract law underwent so-called “materialisation” tendencies, 
meaning that people lost belief in the formally stated equality of the contracting 
parties. Instead, courts began to interpret contracts in favour of the “weaker” or 
“vulnerable” party such as the worker and later the tenant in order to correct 
imbalances of power and thereby market failures. Thus, external collective goals, in 
other words public values reflected in market-correcting measures, began to impact 
the party relationship. 
Ultimately, although they varied across Europe, these developments led to the rise 
of the welfare state throughout the end of the 19th and early 20th century. They 
brought about an extension of state functions, e.g., in the area of health care and 
social security. This tendency has continued in several more refined and more or 
less normatively and empirically well-founded forms until the end of the 20th 
century. Hence, even where state and public power used to be well-defined entities, 
traditional command and control instruments failed to cope with the complexities of 
modern societies. 
The next step constituted the emergence of a protection of fundamental/human 
rights in Europe. In central and some parts of southern Europe following the end of 
WWII, in other parts of southern Europe following the end of totalitarian regimes, 
and since the fall of the Iron Curtain also in Eastern Europe, individuals and to a 
certain extent also legal persons were conferred rights against the interference of 
public power in the private sphere (classical negative dimension). Once it was 
perceived that a lack of resources and the opportunism of private parties were 
liable to infringe fundamental/human rights in a similar fashion to active restrictions 
of those rights, a positive dimension of human/fundamental rights emerged. The 
latter induced the imposition of duties upon states to act, for instance, by adopting 
protective measures or ensuring a certain level of material security. The latest 
stage in the evolution of fundamental rights theory is the controversial recognition 
of their horizontal effect (still known by various doctrinal labels and configurations) 
between private parties which reinforced what is often termed as the 
“constitutionalisation” of private law. 
Most recently, we have been witnessing ambiguous developments. On the one 
hand, regulation expands and is assuming more and more sophistication, e.g. in 
the areas of consumer protection and anti-discrimination law in contractual 
relations, which amounts to an instrumentalisation of private law for political 
purposes. This tendency blurs the divide considerably and suggests that private law 
is a part of public law. On the other, we face the decline and transformation of 
(welfare) state functions in post-modern societies, which results in deregulatory 
tendencies. In the light of globalisation, territoriality is no longer a watertight point 
of reference. Mobility and the juxtaposition of jurisdictions may lead to situations in 
which the provider of benefits and their recipient do not belong to the same 
jurisdiction any longer. Furthermore, government actions are increasingly directed 
towards economic efficiency. New concepts taking due account of the increasing 
cross-border activities of central and local government, public choice, concepts that 
advance cost-benefit analyses and risk assessment replace traditional 
administrative and mainly institutional, static and hierarchical public law concepts 
that originated in the nation-state. They may be reflected in the privatisation and 
the out-sourcing of state functions (such as public security and public services) to 
private actors. These tendencies may also lead to the restructuring of welfare 
concepts: Currently the political objective of equality of outcome (where it has 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 4 (2012) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 32 
Constanze Semmelmann  Theoretical Reflections on the Public-Private… 
existed) is gradually being replaced by the goal of equality of opportunities or the 
goal of inclusion and participation aimed at by anti-discrimination laws. 
Another reason why a distinction between the public and the private element is not 
clear-cut is the recent tendency towards private law-making and the emergence of 
hybrid forms of law-making at the national and transnational level, e.g., in the area 
of commercial relations, labour relations, sports or liberal professions. In this 
context, it may be helpful to distinguish between situations where a public authority 
adopts legal norms that govern issues of both public and private law, as they are 
traditionally defined, on the one hand and situations where norms are adopted by 
private parties, on the other. The former embraces the Kelsenian legal positivist 
position that all private law and public law is state-made law and a distinction 
merely of ideological significance with regard to the opposition of law and power. 
Furthermore, those who consider the law to be instrumental to political objectives 
tend to view any sort of private law as public law, due to its goal-orientation. In 
contrast, the latter situation calls this apparent truism into question since the 
underlying assumption is that the state no longer has the monopoly to create and 
adopt norms. In order to avoid confusion, terminological precision is therefore of 
utmost importance. 
All in all, the new approaches focus on more individual responsibility, oftentimes 
lead to complex interactions between the state and the private parties and the 
market and to private governance that lacks a sound theoretical framework. How 
the simplified bits and pieces of a public-private distinction have developed in 
selected EU Member States will be sketched out in the following section.  
2.3. Comparative 
Sharp divides between public and private law emerged for instance in France 
(Freedland and Auby 2006; Picard 2009), Spain (Velasco Caballero 2009) and 
Germany (Schneider 2009), albeit varying according to the respective historical, 
political and socio-economic context. Where the divide existed in one form or 
another at the substantive level, access to courts and judicial protection was 
traditionally organised strictly along the lines of this divide. This in turn led to the 
distinction between civil and administrative/constitutional jurisdictions in civil law 
traditions, which is mirrored in the academy as a strict dichotomy between public 
and private law in research and education. 
Where the divide has existed in one form or another, it has been facing challenges 
due to the expansion of the welfare state and the more recent tendencies toward 
privatisation and liberalisation of state functions or mixed forms of ownership. The 
effect of fundamental/human rights on private parties as bearers of duties varies 
across those legal orders and the rationalisation of distributional choices has been 
moving into the foreground recently in most legal orders that traditionally relied on 
a clear-cut divide.  
The public interest as opposed to the personal interest of the sovereign emerged in 
16th century absolutist France where public power remained nonetheless 
concentrated in the hands of the king. From the 18th century onwards, the rise of 
liberal ideas reinforced the public-private distinction for the benefit of the 
individuals and against the absolute monarchy. Strong administrative law governing 
far-reaching powers of the executive branch as opposed to the other branches of 
government developed in France beginning with the French Revolution. The divide 
has been rather sharp at the level of court procedure, substance and in academia. 
More recently, both fields have been converging with respect to some procedural 
law aspects or economic regulation. 
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The public-private distinction has existed in Spain since the 12th century with the 
reception of Roman law, and it assumed significance in the 16th century, which was 
characterised by a strong natural law movement. In the 19th century, codes and 
the constitution were intertwined which rendered the divide hence less pronounced, 
whereas public law largely became understood as the newly emerging 
administrative law. Today, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights is not 
controversial in Spanish law, which softens the public-private distinction. The same 
follows from increasing overlaps between both spheres at the level of court 
procedure and substance in areas such as competition law. 
In Germany, a separate public law started to emerge during the 16th and 17th 
centuries driven inter alia by religious conflicts and notably attempts coming from 
protestant religious currents at the academic and educational level in order to 
counter Roman law that was employed by Catholics and supporters of the Emperor 
in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Gradually, a genuine private law 
replaced the regulated economic life that was characterising feudalism and 
mercantilism in the second half of the 18th century. This evolution was further 
advanced in the 19th century. Since the late 19th century, market failures have led 
to the rise of the welfare state in particular in the area of social security protection, 
and in the beginnings of the welfare state, private and public law gradually began 
to intertwine. The public-private distinction is most prominent in the separation of 
public and private law courts. Overlaps do exist in particular where the 
administration acts to cover its own needs and where fundamental rights influence 
the interpretation of private law. Today, only the indirect effect of fundamental 
rights in horizontal relationships has been well-established. 
Whereas a sharp divide between public and private law and a clear-cut concept of 
the state did not exist in the United Kingdom (UK) in the past, their relevance has 
increased in the second half of the 20th century (Dawn 1999; Donnelly 2009). This 
holds true in particular with respect to remedies and procedural law. From the 
outset, it has been well-established in the UK that public bodies are expected to act 
in the public interest and according to their limited powers. In contrast, private 
parties are free to act subject only to the limitations laid down by statute or the 
common law. Since the 1960s, public wrongs are to be challenged by peculiar, i.e. 
public, law remedies. The strengthening and broadening of the emerging public-
private distinction in the UK followed the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 (in 
particular section 6 and the question of who is to respect the rights protected in the 
European Convention of Human Rights) and the increasing involvement of private 
actors in governance matters by virtue of legislation or contracts that raise 
important issues of delegation and accountability. A significant element of 
contemporary UK legal relations is hence the sharing of authority between the 
public and private, e.g. in the area of the provision of welfare and public security, 
aiming at benefitting from innovation, expertise and efficiency of the private sector. 
Against this backdrop, the public-private distinction as suggested by classical liberal 
concepts of the separation between the state and civil society may serve as a 
simplistic analytical tool even though it has never existed in a uniform manner, not 
even across Europe, and where the distinction has existed, it has been blurred 
considerably. Private law has never been wholly autonomous, nor purely 
instrumental, or entirely dependent on any authority beyond the parties’ relations 
(Dagan 2008). Even where its main concern is limited to commutative justice, 
private law has implications for the distribution of wealth even though they are not 
specifically intended (Dagan 2008; Collins 2009). In no legal order have contractual 
relationships entirely escaped the influence of external collective goals, in other 
words public values. Moreover, the concept of a state that has informed the notion 
of “public” law has been perceived differently in various cultures and has developed 
over time. Hence, whenever the terms “public” and “private” are used, they reflect 
the reductionist and relative meaning that can be distilled from the above overview. 
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3. The public-private divide in EU law 
3.1. Use of the terms “public”, “private” or “civil” matters 
The EU Treaties do not follow an express distinction between public and private law 
or legal relations. Rather randomly and absent any terminological or conceptual 
specification, we find the terms “public” and “private” mentioned throughout the 
Treaties.  
Article 4 (2) k TFEU mentions “public health matters” within the allocation of 
competences. Article 36 TFEU refers to the justification of obstacles in the internal 
market on grounds of “public morality, public policy or public security”. Similarly, 
Article 45 TFEU refers to justifications for the restriction of free movement rules on 
grounds of “public policy, public security or public health”. Moreover, the Treaty 
exempts “public service” from the free movement of workers by virtue of Article 45 
(4) TFEU. In the context of the free movement of establishment, Article 54 TFEU 
provides for the following definition: “‘Companies or firms’ means companies or 
firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and 
other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are 
non-profit-making”. Article 106 TFEU refers to “public undertakings” in the context 
of the provision of services of general economic interest. Article 123 (1) TFEU reads 
as follows: “Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European 
Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be 
prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank 
or national central banks of debt instruments”. Article 179 TFEU on research and 
technology mentions “national public contracts”. Concerning the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU, Article 272 TFEU provides that “[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union 
shall have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause 
contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union, whether that 
contract be governed by public or private law.”  
Several Advocates General (AG) have advanced definitions, such as the classical 
definition of public authority given by AG Mayras to justify restrictions on the free 
movement of services: “Official authority is that which arises from the sovereignty 
and majesty of the State; for him who exercises it, it implies the power of enjoying 
the prerogatives outside the general law, privileges of official power and powers of 
coercion over citizens.” (AG Mayras, Case 2/74, Reyners [1974] ECR 657, 664).  
The largely deferential attitude towards the public-private distinction has left some 
even more explicit traces in the Treaty. It was stressed from the beginning that 
national rules governing the system of property ownership would not be affected by 
the Treaties (Article 345 TFEU). This principle highlights that the Treaties did not 
intend to impose any concept of the public-private distinction relating to property 
on the national legal orders.  
Interestingly, in some of the model laws concerning the harmonisation of what is 
generally referred to as “European Private/Contract Law”, we find hints that several 
documents and their authors assume that there is a valid distinction between public 
and private law without, however, undertaking any attempt to determine their 
respective meanings. The Communication from the Commission on European 
Contract Law (European Commission 2001b) was the initiating document. It 
mentions the harmonisation of “substantive private law, in particular contract law” 
(Introduction, 1.1.), and refers to the 16 March 2000 Resolution of the European 
Parliament concerning the Commission’s Work Programme 2000, which mentions 
the “harmonisation of civil law”. Also the European Council of Tampere as 
mentioned in the 2001 Commission Communication (1.3-1.4.) referred to the 
approximation of “civil matters” and “civil proceedings”. Throughout the 
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Communication, the narrower term “contract law” is used. Interestingly, point 2.14 
states that “[i]n certain areas of private law, contracts are not the only tools of 
regulation given the complexity of the relationship between the parties concerned. 
Areas such as employment law and family law give rise to particular issues and are 
not covered by this communication.” One may wonder whether the term 
“particular” points to certain corrective elements restricting contractual freedom 
that are not entirely shared by all Member States. One of the groups charged with 
the preparation of a harmonised “private law” was entitled “Research Group on 
Existing EC Private Law (the ‘Acquis Group’)”. The Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR) also refers to “European Private Law” in its subtitle “Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law” without explaining or 
justifying this classification. The case law of the CJEU increasingly relies on the 
terms “private law” or “civil law” without, however, clarifying the concepts1. 
All in all, where the Treaty, case law or other documents mention the terms “public” 
and “private” law, they do not define them. The task to flesh them out as 
autonomous EU law concepts is left to the CJEU. In the absence of an authoritative 
judicial or legislative definition, it is left to the Member States to pursue their own 
approaches. This means that, except for the few provisions in the Treaties that 
point to either the public or the private element without defining them, EU law has 
deliberately left it to the Member States to determine how they implement their 
obligations flowing from EU law in light of their own national concepts of the 
existence or absence of a public/private law distinction. Whereas in the early days 
of European Integration the absence of exact classifications was less problematic, 
today’s breadth and depth of EU law and its mutual embeddedness with national 
law requires further effort to develop and define a European legal method that 
facilitates the interplay between both levels on the basis of common measuring 
units (Neergaard and Nielsen 2010b). The sources of EU law and the way how they 
interact proves of utmost importance in this context (Bengoetxea 1993, Chapter 1). 
Furthermore, the increasing role of the individual in vertical and horizontal relations 
urgently invites EU law scholarship and judiciary to find solutions for how to deal 
with the divide and its underlying rationale. 
3.2. The functional structure of the Treaties: From where we come to where we 
go 
In the absence of a classification of the Treaty provisions according to their public 
or private nature, a different guiding principle has prevailed since the inception of 
European Integration. Primary and secondary law was, and largely still is, organised 
along the lines of the overall objective of (economic) integration (Schmid 2005; 
Reich 2009; Azoulai 2010; Odudu 2010). EU law paid no heed to the distinction 
between private and public law, because the Treaties have been structured 
according to subject matter and policies, which were functionally related to 
economic integration and the implementation of adjoining policies. Nor has law 
enforcement at the national or supranational level ever been classified according to 
its public or private nature. The rationale behind a functional approach is to ensure 
that EU law applies in a uniform manner throughout the EU and applies precisely 
irrespective of how Member States conceive of the concepts of private and public 
law and their distinction. 
If one wishes to take the existence of a public-private distinction as an analytical 
starting point, it seems that the EU has for a long time adopted only a public-
(international economic)-law approach. State obstacles to cross-border economic 
activities were to be dismantled by the free movement provisions, whereas the 
competition rules as the only exception were addressed to private parties and were 
intended from the beginning to achieve the same goal (CJEU, Cases 56 and 58/64, 
                                                 
1 In the area of the (general) principles of private/civil law, cf. CJEU, Case 412/06, Hamilton [2008] ECR 
I-02383, para. 42; CJEU, Case 489/07, Messner [2009] ECR I-07315, para. 26. 
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Consten Grundig [1966] ECR 299).The overall objective was wealth creation on the 
basis of a large market as a pre-condition to derive economic advantages from 
economies of scale and enhanced specialisation. Progress in the field of social policy 
was regarded as a consequence rather than a precondition of a functioning market 
(Barnard 2011). Non-market values played a minimum albeit increasing role. An 
overarching vision of distributive justice, or fairness, in contracts and other fields 
has clearly been missing in EU law. It has so far been displayed solely as market-
building, mainly due to the lack of a comprehensive legislative competence in many 
policy fields that entail a strong non-market element. 
Whereas the EU is commonly understood as a reflection of a public law entity 
originating in a public international law treaty, the beneficiaries according to the 
internal market rationale have always supposed to be business and consumers – in 
other words private parties. Different sorts of commercial or labour contracts 
between economic actors were certainly present in the minds of the founding 
fathers but, formally speaking, not in the foreground. Accompanied by empirical 
studies on cross-border trade obstacles (for further details, see Vogenauer and 
Weatherill 2005; Smits 2006), the need for a comprehensive harmonisation of 
contract rules culminated only recently in attempts to draft a common civil code. 
The scope of the work follows a traditional definition of private law as understood in 
civil law countries, in other words conceived of as a formal category in contrast to 
public law, but it struggles, however, with its correlation to the existing objective-
driven EU law acquis. It can be classified as an attempt of a comprehensive act of 
positive integration as opposed to the scrutiny of non-harmonised national private 
law rules in light of the free movement provisions. Irrespective of whether a 
common contract law will ever be adopted, the project has brought about a 
fundamental shift with regard to the role of individuals in EU law.  
The following sections of the present article grapple with several areas that are of 
relevance for the question of a public-private distinction in EU law. First, the role 
that the public interest plays in commercial relations and who is entitled to defend 
it will be analysed. Second, horizontal legal relations in the internal market context 
will be tackled, and finally they will be looked at from the perspective of contracts. 
3.3. The market and the state in light of the public-private distinction 
3.3.1. The state and the public interest versus the market and self-interest 
One way to approach the public-private distinction is to look at the relationship 
between the market and the state and its challenges. As a general rule, as has 
been set out previously, the state has after the end of the Middle Ages been 
associated with the common good and the public interest while the market has 
been more closely linked with business transactions and the economic self-interest 
of private actors. One of the particularities of EU law has been that harmonisation 
of the economic legal framework was fostered at the EU level whereas the laws 
implementing non-market policies remained situated at the national level 
notwithstanding their review at EU level and some exceptions to this rule. What is 
at stake is the attempt to strike a balance between market and non-market goals 
and the question of who is entitled to pursue each set of goals. The relationship 
between market and non-market goals constitutes not only a question of 
substance, but also requires choosing the respective level of governance and 
institution (Maduro 1998). The following sections adopt an inductive approach 
seeking to infer the relationship between the state and the market in several fields 
of EU law from the case law. This implies that the EU legal framework as such does 
not allow for a solution to be deduced from Treaty Articles that contain the term 
“social market economy”, for instance, or other provisions like the cross-sector 
clauses that fail to provide for a solution on how to strike the balance between 
market and non-market goals. 
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To begin with, the scope and limits of the free movement and competition rules will 
be sketched out in light of the originally clearly complementary relationship 
between both sets of rules with respect to their addressees and the role of the 
public interest (3.3.2.-3.3.4). Subsequently, it will be demonstrated that a number 
of situations suggest that there is increasing overlap and interaction between both 
sets of rules. In addition, the state action doctrine will be set out briefly (3.3.5) as 
well as the role of private parties in governance matters (3.3.6). Furthermore, the 
examination of the rules on services of general (economic) interest (3.3.7.) and the 
public procurement rules (3.3.8.) illustrates that there is no clear-cut separation 
between the state and the market and hence no clear-cut public-private distinction. 
3.3.2. The scope of the free movement rules and their limits 
According to the original concept of the public international (economic) law concept, 
the Treaties initially attempted to dismantle national barriers to cross-border 
(economic) activities originating from Member States. As a general rule, the 
liberalisation provisions are addressed to Member States like the current Article 34 
TFEU (which reads as follows: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States”) or 
its equivalents with respect to the other freedoms such as Article 49 or 56 TFEU. 
This leads to three conclusions:  
First, so long as restrictions can be traced to legislation or derived acts, the CJEU 
does not determine whether the respective national act is assigned to private or 
public law at the national level. As a general rule, national contract rules are a sort 
of precondition for the exercise of the fundamental freedoms, but they may also 
collide with the latter if the freedom given by the national legislative body is not 
broad enough (Leible 2008). Discriminatory private law rules have been largely 
abolished (Leible 2008), whereas the private law nature of obstacles as such has 
never prevented the CJEU from scrutinising them (CJEU, Case 93/92, CMC 
Motorradcenter [1993] ECR, I-5009; CJEU, Case 69/88, Krantz [1990] ECR, I-583; 
CJEU, Case 190/98, Graf [2000] ECR, I-493). However, the Court seems to have 
introduced a de minimis rule and has often denied the restrictive effects of a 
particular national measure (Leible 2008).  
Second, neither does the Court bother with whether the restriction results from the 
state as a formal concept. The Court interprets the scope of the free movement 
provisions broadly and hence, subjects as many situations as possible to the 
internal market rules. Examples illustrating this broad and functionally, as opposed 
to formally or institutionally, conceived personal scope include, for example, private 
law bodies that are controlled by the state and that have been deemed to fall under 
the scope of the free movement rules (CJEU, Case 249/81, Commission v Ireland 
(Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005). 
Third, the Court has adopted a broad and functional, again as opposed to formal, 
institutional interpretation to the concept of reviewable state authority with regard 
to the legal nature of the professional activity exercised in the context of the free 
movement of persons and in particular its exceptions. It has only exempted very 
few situations under the public-service exception rubric and far from all 
employment positions that are governed by public law. According to the Court, 
Member States can reserve those posts for Member State nationals alone which 
involve “direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public 
law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other 
public authorities and thus presume on the part of those occupying them the 
existence of a special relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights 
and duties which form the foundation of the bond of nationality in order not to 
jeopardise the uniform interpretation and application of the free movement law” 
(CJEU, Case 149/79, Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881; CJEU, Case 405/01, 
Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina Mercante Española [2003] ECR, I-10391). This 
narrow view was confirmed in several infringement procedures on the nationality 
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criterion for the access to notaries in several Member States (cf. CJEU, Cases 47/08 
(European Commission v Belgium) and 51-53/08 (European Commission v 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria) and 61/08 (European Commission v Greece), nyr). 
Another matter that the Court has refused to exempt from the free movement 
provisions is the “golden shares” cases that deal with the special rights of states in 
relation to privatised companies. The thorny question in these cases is whether 
these special rights merely flow from the regular application of corporate law which 
could arguably prevent the applicability of the free movement provisions ratione 
personae, or, whether they flow from the exercise of public authority and are hence 
unambiguously caught by the free movement rules. The starting point is that 
property is one of the crucial elements and preconditions for doing business. 
National rules governing the system of property ownership are not affected by the 
Treaties (Article 345 TFEU). Irrespective of European Integration, states had 
created monopolies or granted special or exclusive rights to private companies, for 
example, in the health care or energy sector. Moreover, certain companies were 
state-owned, state-controlled or state-financed in some sectors. Their activities 
formed part of the welfare state and hence the public interest in those Member 
States. Even after privatisation, states retained special rights with regard to 
decision-making in those privatized companies and related to their commercial 
activities, such as the right of prior approval from public authorities (CJEU, Case 
463/00, Commission v Spain 2003] ECR, I-4581; CJEU, Case 282/04 and 283/04 
Commission v Netherlands [2006] ECR, I-9141) or special voting rights (CJEU, Case 
112/05, Commission v Germany (VW), [2007] ECR I-8995; CJEU, Case 171/08, 
Commission v Portugal, nyr; CJEU, Case 543/08, Commission v Portugal, nyr). 
These particularities became known as “golden shares” and have come under 
scrutiny in the light of the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment. In several more recent cases, the defendant governments claimed 
that the “golden shares” at issue were merely preferred shares under private law 
and even invoked fundamental rights to the property of the shareholders involved. 
The Court rejected this argument, pointing to the Member State’s use of its public 
authority in enacting the enabling legislation under which the golden shares were 
created, and their subsequent use by the state instead of the normal application of 
corporate law (CJEU, Case 171/08, Commission v Portugal, nyr, paras. 41-42, 51-
55; CJEU, Case 543/08, Commission v Portugal, nyr, paras. 51-52.). All of these 
cases demonstrate, and at times expressly highlight, that the state can control the 
commercial activity of privatised companies only under very narrow and well-
defined conditions linked to the public interest. It has been emphasised that 
Member States are precluded from arguing that, by retaining and exercising special 
powers, governments are acting according to the normal application of private 
corporate law from which they derogate given that they hold non-transferable 
shares. The outcome of these decisions of the CJEU was little surprising given that 
according to established case law obstacles, in principle, include both restrictions 
flowing from private and public law. 
3.3.3. Justification of state obstacles in the internal market on public interest 
grounds 
Justifications for restrictions emanating from Member States are conceivable and 
accepted by the Court on various non-market grounds related to the public interest. 
This corresponds to the received wisdom that the state enjoys the necessary 
legitimacy by virtue of the political process in order to define and implement the 
national public interest. At times, the Court has stretched the requirement that 
justification grounds are to be non-economic in nature (e.g., CJEU, Case 158/96, 
Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 41). This situation is to be compared with the one 
under the competition rules, in which the public interest beyond economic 
efficiencies is hardly alluded to outright. 
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3.3.4. The personal scope of the competition rules and the concept of an 
undertaking 
As set out previously, the free movement rules have a counterpart that addresses 
restrictions originating from private parties. The EU competition rules have been 
applicable between private parties since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome (CJEU, 
Case 231/83, Leclerc [1985] ECR 305, para. 16; CJEU, Joined Cases 177 and 
178/82, Van de Haar [1984] ECR 1797, para. 24 clearly stressing that the 
competition rules are not addressed to states). It was stated beautifully in the early 
competition decision Consten Grundig (CJEU, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, 
Consten-Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299), which involved the prohibition of 
absolute territorial protection through vertical agreements that “the Treaty, whose 
preamble and content aim at abolishing the barriers between states, and which in 
several provisions gives evidence of a stern attitude with regard to their re-
appearance, could not allow undertakings to reconstruct such barriers. Article 
[101(1) TFEU] is designed to pursue this aim, even in the case of agreements 
between undertakings placed at different levels in the economic process” (p. 340).  
The functional concept of the “undertaking” (and the entities equated to an 
undertaking mentioned in Article 101 and 102 TFEU) is the focal point of the 
competition rules and determines their scope of application, in contrast to the free 
movement provisions which are geared towards public actors. An “undertaking” is 
defined in functional terms as “every entity engaged in an economic activity, 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed” 
(CJEU, Case 41/90, Höfner&Elser [1991] ECR, I-1979, para. 21 in the context of 
employment procurement). According to the logic that private parties pursue their 
own commercial interests, the public-interest justification for restrictions on 
competition are not generally provided in the Treaties. The Commission and the 
Courts have, on occasion, identified public interest justifications for anti-competitive 
measures. It is unclear, however, whether, and to what extent, a reference to a 
justification based on environmental protection, labour protection or the safeguard 
of professional ethics crosses over to generate pro-competitive effects, or whether, 
on the other hand, it has effects beyond a competition and efficiency analysis, 
hence allowing private parties to pursue a public policy goal, which would prove to 
be highly controversial.  
This double duality between the free movement rules and the competition rules on 
the one hand and between the public international economic law discourse and the 
role of contracts and private law on the other does not mean that things have not 
developed in various directions. 
As set out earlier, the key to determining the scope of competition law, as opposed 
to the realm of the free movement provisions, is the concept of an “undertaking”. 
The Höfner formula cited above proposes a functional test that is blind to the 
institutional structure of the respective entity and instead looks at its function. 
Notwithstanding the applicability of more specific rules, state ownership or control 
would not preclude the application of the competition rules. Whether this test can 
be satisfied is to be determined with regard to each activity under scrutiny. 
Accordingly, the Court has exempted from the competition rules all activities that 
are non-economic in character, which includes the exercise of official authority in 
the public interest and also those that regulate markets in the public interest. The 
latter is to be viewed in contrast to the participation of an entity in the market, 
which consists of offering goods and services in a given market (CJEU, Joined Cases 
180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR, I-6451, para. 75). Activities 
that lead to an exemption include public interest tasks, such as the maintenance of 
air navigation safety (CJEU, Case 364/92, SAT Fluggesellschaft [1994] ECR, I-43, 
paras. 30-31) or the protection of the environment (CJEU, Case 343/95, Diego 
Calì&Figli [1997] ECR, I-01547, para. 16), which are considered to form part of the 
essential functions of the state. In the health and insurance sector, no economic 
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activity exists where an exclusively social objective of an activity dominates and 
market mechanisms are entirely absent (for an overview of the case law see, e.g., 
AG Maduro, Case 205/03, FENIN [2006] ECR, I-6295 paras. 16-22). So far, the 
Court has considered the nature of the purchase of a certain good and its 
subsequent use as non-severable (CJEU, Case 205/03, FENIN [2006] ECR, I- 6295, 
para. 26; CJEU, Case 113/07, SELEX [2009] ECR, I-2207, paras. 102 et seq.). 
Certain collective bargaining agreements concluded between employers’ and 
employees’ representatives and also encouraged by the Treaty have been 
exempted from the competition rules (CJEU, Case 67/96, Albany [1999] ECR, I-
5751; CJEU, Joined Cases 115-117 and 119/97, Brentjes 1999 ECR, I-6025). All in 
all, the competition rules are only inapplicable under limited conditions in which the 
genuine exercise of public authority in a strict sense is at stake or the market 
mechanism entirely absent. 
To sum up, the functional concept of the undertaking is the focal point that 
determines the extent of competition rules as opposed to the domain of the free 
movement provisions. This dichotomy can in turn be said to reflect the EU’s own 
brand of public-private divide. The details of its characterising feature, the 
economic activity, remain fuzzy. As a general rule and as a mirror image of the free 
movement rules, the personal scope of the competition rules is interpreted quite 
broadly. Only the total absence of market mechanisms and the exercise of genuine 
public authority in a narrow sense and viewed in relation to a particular activity can 
justify exemptions from the competition rules. 
3.3.5. State action doctrine 
Another similar yet slightly distinct field of overlap between the public and the 
private element has led to the creation of a European “state action doctrine”. The 
major issue underlying this doctrine is that the state backed by the democratic 
process facilitates or reinforces the anti-competitive conduct of private parties 
based on their alleged involvement in the public interest. The starting point remains 
that the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are concerned solely with the conduct of 
undertakings and not with regulatory measures emanating from the Member 
States. In relation to the competition rules, however, read in conjunction with 
Article 4 (2) TEU, the CJEU has developed several categories of cases in which the 
competition rules require Member States not to introduce or maintain measures in 
force, even those of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may render ineffective 
the competition rules applicable to undertakings (for a recent decision see, e.g., 
CJEU, Case 198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (“CIF”) [2003] ECR, I-8055, 
para. 45). Accordingly, the Articles 4 (2) TEU and 101 TFEU are infringed when a 
Member State “requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices contrary to Article [101 TFEU] or reinforces their effects, or 
when it divests its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating 
responsibility for making decisions affecting the economic sphere to private 
economic operators”. This has become particularly relevant in the context of 
(sometimes state-influenced) self-regulation of certain professions such as lawyers 
or medical doctors and their professional bodies. What moves to the foreground is 
the identification of the exact role of the state and the public-interest criteria that 
potentially influence the conduct of the private parties in contrast to a conduct 
which is exclusively imputable to, and, in the interest of, the undertakings. An 
autonomous delegation-test has to date not been outlined in unambiguous terms 
and the case law has not always been consistent (Sauter and Schepel 2009). 
Relevant cases deal with the interaction of state legislation with private parties’ 
conduct. Examples include the interaction of legislation that fixes retail prices with 
the anti-competitive conduct of the market participants (CJEU, Case 198/01, 
“CIF”[2003] ECR, I-8055,) or state measures that approve, on the basis of a draft 
produced by a professional body of members of the Bar, a tariff fixing minimum 
and maximum fees for members of the profession (CJEU, Case 35/99, Arduino 
[2002] ECR, I-1529; CJEU, Joined Cases C-94/04 & C-202/04, Cipolla v. Fazari 
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[2006] ECR, I-2049). Where undertakings are required by national legislation to 
engage in anti-competitive conduct, they cannot be held accountable for the 
infringement of the competition rules. In these cases, national law precludes 
undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents, restricts or 
distorts competition. If there remains room for the autonomous conduct of the 
private parties, the allocation of responsibilities is highly controversial. These cases 
show that functionalism (here doctrinally construed by reliance on the loyalty clause 
read in conjunction with the competition rules) has also impacted cases in which 
public and private power interact in a way that leads to the infringement of 
competition rules. Nonetheless, the blurred line between the competition and free 
movement rules has been complicated by the “state action doctrine” and, more 
precisely, by the failure to determine clearly the existence of and the role for the 
public interest and the link between the state and private conduct in the respective 
cases. 
3.3.6. Private parties and governance 
There is an increasing shift towards private governance, different forms of self-
regulation of certain sectors and hybrid regulatory systems instead of legislation 
while self-regulatory tendencies have prevailed in some fields for historical reasons. 
Self-regulation, or any other form of private regulation, is cherished in particular for 
its potential to enhance (substantive) self-determination in certain sectors by 
representing and balancing affected interests and democratic legitimacy, along with 
increasing efficiency by enhancing expertise and flexibility (Schiek 2007). 
Self-regulation faces a number of concerns (Ogus 1996). Because it was created to 
serve the interests of the regulatees, the rules may in fact be in tension with the 
public interest. Ideally, self-regulation should not foster monopolisation, but instead 
enable two or more self-regulation agreements to formulate alternative regimes. 
The self-regulation of professions, for instance, can restrict entry into the market, 
serve the professions rather than the consumers, and distort price competition. 
Moreover, where public functions are delegated to private actors, public 
accountability mechanisms are inevitably lost and the preservation of legal 
responsibilities for those acting on behalf of the public authorities becomes crucial 
(Gilmour and Jensen 1998). Hence, uncontrolled self-regulation cannot be 
accepted. Along with the conceptual difficulties in separating the public and the 
private spheres, fundamental differences remain. The fact that state bodies are 
politically and legally accountable to the electorate or its representatives is 
regarded as legitimising their powers and providing individuals with protection 
against abuses. Where private parties undertake to achieve public goals, they 
would, first and foremost, have to define what the public interest is and whether 
they do indeed pursue the public interest. Secondly, their link to the political 
process would have to be discussed. 
At the EU level, self-regulation was, inter alia, mentioned and defined in the Inter-
institutional Agreement on Better Law Making (European Parliament et al. 2003). 
Private regulation has been particularly encouraged by competition policy 
documents and other guidelines since the beginning of the new millennium in the 
area of environmental protection as a new method of governance in the form of 
voluntary commitments and agreements. The Commission’s Green Paper on 
corporate social responsibility and a subsequent Commission Communication 
generally underscored this approach, according to which companies voluntarily 
decide to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment by the 
integration of social and environmental concerns into their business operations 
(European Commission 2001a).  
More restrictive approaches have been voiced to the extent that in very recent 
interpretative guidelines, which also departed from their previous versions, 
horizontal environmental agreements were no longer displayed as a separate 
category of a horizontal agreement (European Commission 2011b).This means that 
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the test for environmental agreements would be the general one developed under 
Article 101 TFEU. In other words, it all depends on the concept of economic 
efficiencies and the notion of the consumer, causality criteria and their ability to 
stretch in order to include environmental protection. It is needless to recall that the 
only authoritative interpretations are the decisions of the CJEU. Contrary to the 
categories of cases discussed in the previous sections where the influence of the 
state and/or the public interest could lead to the application of free movement rules 
or the state action doctrine, the CJEU occasionally, and a little surprisingly, has 
preferred to base its decision exclusively on the competition rules even though 
there was a link to the public interest. The Court has ruled that where there is 
neither state influence with regard to the appointment of members of the governing 
bodies of the Bar in a Member State, nor a requirement to take into account the 
public interest in self-regulation matters, the professional organisations such as the 
Bar are regarded as an association of undertakings. A decision that refuses to 
authorise partnerships between members of the Bar and accountants hence could a 
priori fall under Article 101 TFEU (CJEU, Case 309/99, Wouters, [2002] ECR, I-
1577, paras. 57-72). However, according to a sort of “public interest rule of 
reason”, the Court has held that such a prohibition of multi-disciplinary partnerships 
could be reasonably considered necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of 
the legal profession (Wouters, paras. 73-110). The Court argued that the anti-
competitive effects of the respective rules on the organisation, qualifications, 
professional ethics, supervision and liability were inherent in the pursuit of the 
objectives to ensure that the ultimate consumers of legal services and sound 
administration of justice are given necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and 
experience (para. 97). This approach was confirmed with respect to the anti-doping 
rules adopted by international sporting associations (CJEU, Case 519/04 P, Meca 
Medina [2006] ECR, I-6991, paras. 42 et seq). 
The previous competition law cases allegedly allowing for public policy 
considerations are conceptually problematic because they lack the explicit 
involvement of the state, yet they nonetheless involve aspects which are generally 
classified as public interest, without simultaneously establishing links to the political 
process and providing for accountability mechanisms. They are an excellent 
reminder that a sound theoretical legal framework over and above soft law 
documents is imperative for self-regulation and corporate responsibility. Such a 
legal framework would also ideally address the question of when the public interest 
translates into economic efficiencies (Semmelmann 2008). It goes without saying 
that competition law offers only one way of looking at private governance alongside 
the perspective of fundamental rights and other constitutional principles that may 
interact with the competition analysis.  
3.3.7. Services of general (economic) interest 
Another border between the state and the market are the services of (general) 
economic interest2 that find expression in Article 14 TFEU, Article 36 of the 
Fundamental Rights Charter, Article 106 (2) TFEU, Protocol 26 attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty and numerous soft law documents. Even though the Commission 
recognises the need to shield certain traditions in relation to the regulation of 
access to energy, telecommunications, transport or postal services from the 
market, the general rule is that their legal arrangements should comply with the 
Treaties unless they meet the conditions set out in Article 106 (2) TFEU, which is 
directly effective, as a service of general economic interest entrusted to privileged 
undertakings. According to the CJEU, in “allowing derogations to be made from the 
                                                 
2 The concept of “services of economic interest” has until its incorporation into Protocol 26 to the Lisbon 
Treaty only been mentioned in soft law documents and tends to refer to services provided in the non-
economic public interest. The concept of “services of general economic interest” in contrast constitutes 
the well-known legal concept that is anchored in the Treaties. See further (Neergaard and Nielsen 2010 
b, 475). 
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general rules of the Treaty on certain conditions, that provision seeks to reconcile 
the Member States’ interest in using certain undertakings, in particular in the public 
sector, as an instrument of economic and fiscal policy with the Community’s 
interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on competition and the preservation 
of the unity of the common market” (CJEU, Case 202/88, Terminal Directive [1991] 
ECR, I-223, para. 12). The obligation to provide services in the public interest must 
ultimately be based on a public act (CJEU, Case 127/73, BRT v Sabam [1974] ECR 
313, para. 20). 
Contrary to the former test which appeared to be based strictly on economic 
criteria, non-market criteria such as environmental protection or equality concerns 
seem to have cautiously found their way into the catalogue of justification criteria, 
which brings this provision closer to the mandatory requirements under the free 
movement provisions (Neergaard and Nielsen 2010 b ). Article 106 (2) TFEU has 
also been relied on in order to exempt certain subsidies from the notion of state aid 
(CJEU, Case 280/00, Altmark Trans [2003] ECR, I–7747; CJEU, Joined Cases 34-
38/01, Enirisorse [2003] ECR, I-14243). The ongoing developments suggest a 
great deal of legal uncertainty, but they tend to enhance the discretion of national 
bodies to define their services of general (economic) interest in the absence of 
European legislation and to justify their impact on the market by virtue of an 
increasingly lenient proportionality test (Sauter and Schepel 2009). All in all, the 
existing norms and documents illustrate that the Treaty provides for a mechanism 
to balance the competition rules and the use of certain undertakings for the 
purposes of legitimate public policy. 
3.3.8. Public procurement between the state and the market 
Public procurement directives have been adopted at the EU level in particular for 
the award of public contracts in the supplies, works and service sectors as well as in 
public utilities in order for economic operators to benefit fully from the free 
movement rules in the area of public procurement. In addition to the objective of 
rendering award procedures more rational, transparent and fair, the potential lack 
of commercial discipline in public purchasing and the potential for preferential 
treatment in favour of national or local economic operators are meant to be 
counteracted by the public procurement rules (European Commission 2011a). 
The public procurement rules govern activities of “the state” that are less based on 
the exercise of public authority than on the need to secure the functioning of its 
own activities. In the present context, which entities the public procurement rules 
apply to is of utmost interest while the role of public policy in the form of non-
market objectives also deserves some attention. 
Two major directives define the term “contracting authority” that determines the 
personal scope of the public procurement rules (Article 2 Directive 2004/17 and 
Article 1(9) Directive 2004/18). Whereas the term “state” and “local and regional 
authorities” therein are relatively straightforward and understood in a functional as 
opposed to a formal institutional sense (according to CJEU, Case 31/87, Beentjes 
[1988] ECR 4635, para. 11, the concept of the “state” includes bodies that the 
state entrusted by legislation with certain tasks), the third alternative “bodies 
governed by public law” is more complex, essentially depending (cumulatively) on 
the purpose for which it is established (general interest or industrial / commercial 
character), whether it has legal personality and the degree of state control in terms 
of financing or supervision. The Court interprets this functional notion broadly 
(CJEU, Case 373/00, Truley [2003] ECR, I-1931, para. 43). This ensures the 
efficient enforcement of the public procurement rules regardless of the 
particularities in Member States’ legal orders. Ultimately depending on a case-by-
case analysis, taking into account factors such as the degree of competition in the 
market, the concept of need in the general interest and the issue of profit and 
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allocation of risks, public bodies may escape the reach of the public procurement 
rules under narrow conditions (European Commission 2011a).3 
Large projects involve considerable financial efforts and carry a number of risks 
that invite co-operation in order to share the burden. Under EU law, public 
authorities are free to pursue economic activities themselves or to assign them to 
third parties.  
In several judgments the CJEU has invoked the right to local self-government and 
made it clear that the possibility for public authorities to use their own resources to 
perform the public-interest tasks conferred on them may be exercised in 
cooperation with other public authorities. Public-public cooperation, including in-
house situations and horizontal non-institutionalised cooperation, under certain 
conditions may be excluded from the scope of the public procurement rules.4  
Public entities may also co-operate with private companies, which is known under 
the label of “public-private-partnerships” (“PPPs”). This is, however, not a legal 
term. If PPPs qualify for public contracts or works concessions (service concessions 
are excluded from the procurement rules and subject to the free movement 
provisions and general principles of EU law), they must comply with the public 
procurement rules at EU level, notwithstanding the general applicability of the free 
movement provisions and the general principles of EU law such as equality, 
transparency and proportionality. From the outset, contractual PPPs including 
concessions, for instance (minor aspects are governed by the public procurement 
directives), are distinguished from institutionalised PPPs that involve the 
establishment of an entity held jointly by the public and the private partner, which 
are also known by the name “joint venture”. The creation of a mixed-capital entity 
is not in itself covered by the public procurement rules whereas the award of tasks 
may fall under the directives or EU law in general. The “competitive dialogue” laid 
down in Article 29 of Directive 2004/18 may be relevant in this context. PPPs tend 
not to escape the public procurement rules as soon as one partner is privately 
owned, even to a small extent.5 
As to the second aspect that touches upon the interplay between the public and 
private element, the public procurement rules have in one form or another taken 
into account the influence of public policies such as social policy or environmental 
protection. Contracting authorities are in general free in the basic decision as to 
“what to buy” as long as the characteristics of the works, products and services are 
transparent and non-discriminatory, whereas the public procurement rules apply in 
particular with regard to the question of “how to buy”. As a general rule, these 
objectives, such as environmental protection or social policy aspects, can be 
                                                 
3 On these aspects, in particular on the issue of the need in the general interest, cf. CJEU, Case 360/96, 
BFI Holding [1998] ECR, I-6821, paras. 43-44 (removal and treatment of household refuse); CJEU, Case 
373/00, Truley [2003] ECR, I-1931 (funeral undertakers); CJEU, Case 44/96, Mannesmann Anlagenbau 
[1998] ECR, I-73, para. 26 (printing business); CJEU, Case 18/01, Kohonen [2003] ECR I-5321, para.51 
(buying, selling and leasing properties and organising and supplying property maintenance services). 
4 Cf., e.g., CJEU, Case 107/98, Teckal [1999] ECR 8121 (in-house situation: control of public body over 
entity in a similar way to that in which public bodies control their own departments); CJEU, Case 26/03, 
Stadt Halle [2005] ECR I-1; CJEU, Case 458/03, Parking Brixen [2005] ECR, I-8585 and the follow-up 
case law such as CJEU, Case 324/07, nyr, Coditel; CJEU, Case 573/07, Sea [2009] ECR, I-8127, 
para. 46; CJEU, Case 480/06, Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-4747, para.45 (contractual 
horizontal non-institutionalised cooperation with public authorities); for details, e.g., Sauter and Schepel 
2009, Commission 2011 a and 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/partnerships/cooperation/index_en.htm 
(including a recent staff paper on public-public cooperation). 
5 For details, cf. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/partnerships/public-
private/index_en.htm; Bovis, 51 et seq., and the case law CJEU, Case 26/03, Stadt Halle [2005] ECR, I-
1; CJEU, Case 410/04, ANAV [2006] ECR, I-3303; CJEU, Case 196/08, Acoset [2009] ECR, I-9913 
(double competitive tendering procedure is not required in connection with the award of contracts to, or 
the conferral of certain tasks on, newly established PPPs if certain conditions are met); CJEU, Case 
215/09, Mehiläinen Oy, nyr. 32 et seq.;  
on joint procurement (aggregate demand) see Commission 2011 a, 23. 
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incorporated into the requirements of the subject matter of a contract, the technical 
specifications, the selection criteria, the award criteria and the contract 
performance (European Commission 2011a). Some of these possibilities can be 
found in the case law.6 Thus, as the recent Green Paper of 2011 points out, the 
first objective of the envisaged modernisation is to increase the efficiency of public 
spending. A complementary objective is to make better use of public procurement 
in support of societal goals, whilst this does not exclude a conflict of goals. This 
shows rather that even though the state does not act as a public authority in a 
narrow sense, but rather at an earlier stage in order to enable the exercise of public 
authority, it is entitled to pursue public policies in addition to the efficiency goal in 
the context of public procurement (Losada 2012). 
3.4. From inter-state concepts via vertical relationships to horizontal 
relationships 
It has already been highlighted that the interplay between the state and the market 
is a very complex issue, characterised by the attempt to subject as many situations 
as possible to the market rules by adopting functional approaches with respect to 
the personal scope of the free movement and competition rules (the competition 
rules understood in a broad sense). A further important area displaying the 
functional organisation of the Treaties and its evolution is the development of legal 
relations covered by EU law. In the inception of European Integration, legal 
relations were situated amongst Member States and between Member States and 
the EU. The Court shifted the focus toward vertical relations between private parties 
and public power in the 1960s. Today, EU law grapples increasingly with horizontal 
legal relations, i.e. legal relations between private parties on both sides. This 
development draws our attention to the personal scope of primary and secondary 
EU law. Taking the question of the personal scope of EU law a step further, it also 
includes the evolution of liability for breaches of EU law in vertical and horizontal 
relationships. 
According to the original concept of the public international (economic) law Treaty, 
the Treaties in the first place aimed at dismantling national barriers to cross-border 
(economic) activities originating from Member States. The view of the treaty 
provisions as norms governing inter-state-relations and the relationship between 
the EU and its members has been fundamentally modified since the introduction of 
the direct effect of the free movement provisions in the early 1960s in the case Van 
Gend en Loos. In this seminal judgment, the Court underscored that the new legal 
order entailed Member States and individuals as its subjects, and that the Treaty 
expressly and implicitly confers rights and imposes obligations on Member States 
and on individuals (CJEU, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1). The direct 
effect of EU primary law led to the enforcement of (economic) integration goals vis-
à-vis public power before national bodies, i.e. vertically. The direct effect within the 
meaning of the Van Gend en Loos judgment is still a highly controversial concept, 
but it is basically a question of the precise and unconditional character of a norm. 
Some emphasise that direct effect has merely encouraged the instrumentalisation 
of private parties for integration purposes by allowing for efficient enforcement of 
EU law irrespective of its implementation in or transposition into national law 
(Rutgers 2009), in other words, as an additional means of enforcing EU law next to 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., CJEU, Case 513/99, Concordia Bus Finland [2002] ECR, I-07213 (on environmental 
protection as award criterion); CJEU, Case 76/81, Beentjes [1982] ECR 417 (on the requirement of 
employment of long-term unemployed persons); CJEU, Case 384/07, Wienstrom [2008] ECR, I-10393 
(environmental protection as award criterion); see, however, CJEU, Case 346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR, I-
1989 (whether to respect wage conditions of a collective agreement as award criterion for public works 
contract; the case was ultimately decided on the basis of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services); cf. the initiatives at the political level and, in 
particular, within the Commission forming part of socially responsible governance set out in the 
documents on green, social and innovative public procurement at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/other_aspects/index_en.htm. 
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the infringement action and the preliminary ruling. However, others have 
elaborated more extensively on the rights-language also alluded to in the Van Gend 
en Loos judgment because they advocate a genuine rights-language as it is known 
in some national legal systems or consider the direct effect as the beginning of the 
end of inter-governmentalism to an extent (Mestmäcker 1978; Müller-Graff 2001; 
Halberstam 2005; Grundmann 2008). 
The Court’s language allows for both interpretations or favoured one over the other 
one in certain stages of EU integration (Maduro 1998; Halberstam 2005; 
Bengoetxea 2008; Azoulai 2010; de Witte 2011) when it held that the new legal 
order “produces direct effect and creates individual rights which national courts 
must protect”. Echoing the submission of the Commission, the Court ruled that "this 
Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations 
between the contracting parties”. This does not prevent differences in national 
procedural law to lead to nuanced outcomes across Member States. To date, it has 
remained notoriously unclear when a rights-language prevails that may lead to a 
“substitution effect” at a national level and when the impact of EU law is confined to 
an “exclusionary effect” vis-à-vis conflicting national law (Bengoetxea 2008; de 
Witte 2011). 
No matter whether one stops at the idea of the instrumentalisation of private 
parties as an additional enforcement instrument or whether one goes further and 
follows up on the rights-language of the Court, private parties entered the game as 
then exotic players for some time only as law enforcers and/or bearers of rights, 
i.e. in a vertical dimension. The direct effect of primary law was refined in 
subsequent decisions with regard to its concept, conditions, and its applicability to 
secondary legislation (de Witte 2011). 
The next step was the application of EU law between private parties, i.e. its 
horizontal dimension. The horizontal application of the free movement provisions 
targets restrictions on cross-border economic activities arising between private 
parties and thereby imposes obligations on individuals. In addition to the question 
of justiciability discussed in the context of the direct effect in vertical situations, the 
core of the direct applicability of a norm in horizontal settings lies in the 
controversial public-private distinction. In other words, the applicability of a norm in 
a contractual relationship is not only a justiciability issue, but also a question of the 
substance and the nature of the underlying relationship. It has to do with the 
question of on whom a norm can impose obligations, and, whether there are more 
specific sets of rules governing the relationship between private parties pursuing 
their self-interest such as the competition rules. Contractual relations including 
labour relations or corporate law by their very nature do involve non-state actors 
on both/all sides. 
The horizontal application of primary and secondary law has remained controversial 
to date. In Defrenne II, the Court recognised the horizontal applicability of the 
principle of equal pay between men and women in employment even though the 
respective provision was and still is formally addressed to Member States (CJEU, 
Case 43/75, Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455, para. 31). The Court accepted the 
indirect horizontal applicability of the free movement rules in two cases by 
establishing a duty of state bodies to observe fundamental rights and freedoms in 
horizontal proceedings (CJEU, Case 265/95, Commission v France [1997] ECR, I-
6956; CJEU, Case 112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR, I-5659). The direct 
horizontal applicability of free movement provisions was recognised with regard to 
the free movement of persons (CJEU, Case 36/74, Walrave [1974] ECR 1405; 
CJEU, Case 415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR, I-4921; CJEU, Case 281/98, Angonese 
[2000] ECR, I-4139 and follow-up cases such as CJEU, Case 94/07, Raccannelli 
[2008] ECR I-05939), services (CJEU, Case 341/05, Laval [2007] ECR, I 11767) 
and the freedom of establishment (CJEU, Case 438/05, Viking [2007] ECR, I-
10779) even though its rationale has remained open to multiple interpretations. So 
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far, bodies that are not public authorities may be addressees of obligations under 
EU law in relation to rules that aim at regulating gainful employment or the 
provision of services in a collective (Walrave, Bosman) or individual manner 
(Angonese). This has been extended to the collective action of trade unions which, 
according to the Court, also ultimately aims at regulating gainful employment or is 
at least inextricably connected to regulating gainful employment (Viking, Laval). An 
important argument to equate the private with public power under the free 
movement provisions was the functional argument, combined with the effet utile 
argument. The effet utile dimension of it is that in relation to the goal, namely to 
establish and maintain an internal market, the abolition of state obstacles must not 
be neutralised by bodies that are not governed by public law (Walrave, Bosman, 
Angonese). The other element of the argument is that with respect to employment, 
only a functional view is liable to avoid certain inequalities in the application of EU 
law since working conditions in the different Member States are sometimes 
governed by provisions laid down by law or regulation and sometimes by collective 
agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by private persons (Walrave, 
Bosman, Angonese, Viking). The legal autonomy and certain rights of these non-
public actors have often been vaguely indicated in this context (Walrave, Viking) 
but unfortunately not discussed in more detail. Another argument in favour of 
imposing obligations on non-state actors was to stress the weakness of the textual 
argument that pointed to the Member States as addressees of the free movement 
provisions or Article 157 (1) TFEU (Defrenne II, Angonese, Viking). Regrettably, the 
line between the direct and indirect horizontal application of free movement 
provisions has not been delineated clearly by the Court (Mangold, Kücükdeveci).  
The crucial question remains to determine the criteria for why and under what 
conditions EU law can impose obligations on non-state actors, i.e. complement the 
rights-dimension of the free movement provisions if one accepts it by a duty-
dimension. The case law appears to equate obstacles originating from the private 
sphere with public power on the basis of criteria such as the 
normative/regulatory/quasi-regulatory power and mere socio-economic power 
comparable to the one inherent in state action. 
In my view, a viable test can hardly be based on the mere effects of a measure that 
are allegedly equated to the one of a state measure. It seems that labour relations 
enjoy a particular role as a partly regulated area, whereas it would be desirable to 
stress whether the Court proceeds from the assumption that there is an imbalance 
of power between both sides, or why the application of the competition rules should 
not apply to both industrial relations, which is not at all obvious. This imbalance of 
power argument would however only apply to the application of the free movement 
provisions against the “stronger” side, i.e. the employers. What should matter, in 
my view, is whether or not any of the addressees of obligations under the free 
movement provisions act in the public interest (Streinz and Leible 2000; Baquero 
Cruz 2002; Odudu 2006, 2010; Semmelmann 2010; de Witte 2011), which may 
vary among Member States in relation to both parties in employment relations. 
Going beyond the requirement of a public interest criterion would unnecessarily blur 
the borderline between the competition and the free movement rules and overly 
stretch the scope of the justification grounds. Assuming that in light of the 
maturisation of EU law competition law is not considered sufficient to capture 
private power, contracts as such need to be accommodated by the functional 
economic integration paradigm on a more comprehensive doctrinal basis in order to 
put an end to the era where rights exist without duties (see at 3.5.). The Court 
would be relieved from subjecting employment relationships to the free movement 
provisions by adopting an overly broad concept of functionalism if their roots in 
contract law were openly recognised and if a body of EU private law developed, and 
in one way or another included, labour relationships. 
In secondary law, and in particular with respect to directives, the classical reading 
is that as additional enforcement instruments directives apply in horizontal 
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relationships only under exceptional conditions. This stance was softened by the 
broadening of the notion of the state. The Court took an institutional as opposed to 
a functional approach with regard to the role of the state as an employer which 
deviates from the otherwise preferred functional approach. In order to ensure the 
effectiveness of a directive in the case of improper implementation, it ruled that the 
well-established doctrine on the vertical direct effect of directives applies to the 
state regardless of the capacity in which it is acting, “whether as an employer or as 
public authority” (CJEU, Case 152/84, Marshall [1986] ECR 723, para. 49; CJEU, 
Case 188/89 Foster [1990] ECR, I-03313, para. 17). While the reach of the so-
called incidental direct effect in triangular relationships is not crystal-clear (cf. AG 
Bot, Case 555/07, nyr, Kücükdeveci), recent judgments may suggest that the lines 
towards the horizontal direct effect of directives have become more indistinct than 
ever before (CJEU, Case 144/04, Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981; CJEU, Case 555/07, 
nyr, Kücükdeveci). As a general rule, however, and irrespective of the unusual and 
complex interaction between general principles and directives in those cases, 
obligations directly derived from directives in horizontal relationships remain the 
exception rather than the rule. It is obvious that labour relationships and hence the 
content of certain directives (that is to be divorced from mere enforcement) cause 
particular difficulties also in this context. 
Once the personal scope of a given EU law norm has been established in the light of 
the principles set out above, one also has to examine liability questions in case of 
breaches of the respective EU law norm. When it comes to secondary judicial 
protection, the principle of state liability has been firmly established as an 
additional tool for non-state actors to have damages compensated if the Member 
States fail to fulfill their duties under EU law (CJEU, Joined Cases 6/90 and 9/90, 
Francovich [1991] ECR, I-5357). Taking this vertical liability a step further leads us 
to the issue of the still underdeveloped horizontal liability of private persons. So far, 
liability originating in EU law in horizontal relationships has only been accepted in 
cases involving breaches of EU competition law by private parties (CJEU, Case 
453/99, Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR, I-6297; CJEU, Joined Cases 295-298/04, 
Manfredi [2006] ECR, I-6619). This is hardly surprising given that competition law 
as such applies directly between economic actors who exercise an economic activity 
as undertakings. Article 101 (2) TFEU deals with the impact of an infringement of 
the competition rules on a commercial contract by stating absolute and automatic 
nullity of a contract in this event. The liability of private parties in horizontal 
relationships in other areas such as any sort of contract law has so far been left to 
the procedural autonomy of the Member States, modified by the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. This is a little surprising given that a common 
European contract and tort law as the classical area for reciprocity and 
commutative justice is not yet existent -although it is emerging. With a view to 
effective and uniform remedies throughout the EU and a growing focus on the 
individual in EU law (Article 47 Charter, 19 (1) TEU, CJEU, Case 432/05, Unibet 
[2007] ECR, I-2271), further sophistication of horizontal liability in cases of 
breaches of EU law appears inevitable. 7 
Even if we have so far refrained from a genuine rights-language in the EU internal 
market context, the consolidation of fundamental rights protection no longer allows 
for such a limited view. Instead, it invites us to take a fresh look at the role of 
individuals and private parties. According to Article 51 of the EU Fundamental 
Rights Charter, its provisions are addressed to EU public power and Member States 
when they implement EU law (which is, arguably, to be understood in a broad 
sense). The Convention did not tackle the issue of the horizontal application even 
though the title “solidarity” entails several social rights and principles that 
traditionally govern the relations between private parties such as the right to strike, 
                                                 
7 On the continuation of the Laval-saga as liability case before the Swedish courts,  Bernitz and Reich; 
for a recent view of the CJEU on the liability question in labour relations, CJEU, Case 282/10, nyr, 
Maribel Dominguez. 
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which is laid down in Article 28 of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, which seems 
to make their horizontal applicability inevitable. Moreover, it remains conceivable 
that one day free movement rules and economic fundamental rights will be merged 
so that their horizontal application equally requires a solution. For the time being, 
fundamental rights, which have so far been recognised as general principles of EU 
law, will continue to co-exist alongside the codified rights and principles, although a 
certain convergence of sources incorporating fundamental rights is highly desirable. 
The question of the direct applicability of general principles has remained opaque in 
the recent case law in particular with respect to horizontal situations and in cases 
where the prohibition of age discrimination reflected in a general principle 
interacted with the relevant Directive 2000/78 and possibly also with the respective 
overlapping provision laid down in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter (cf. Mangold, 
Kücükdeveci, cf. also irrespective of age discrimination AG Trstenjak, Case 282/10, 
nyr, Maribel Dominguez). 
Whereas typically, EU law and its interpretation by the Courts has been restrictive 
with respect to the imposition of obligations on private parties, the Court will have 
to develop a sound theoretical framework for why and under what conditions EU 
law imposes obligations on non-state actors. The Court will not have to rely on such 
criteria, like the effect of obstacles that result from private power, if the need to 
take into account contractual relations under EU law is clarified. This leads us to the 
issue of the emergence of a common European contract law, its scope and its 
theoretical soundness, which will be tackled in the next section. 
3.5. Evolution of a genuine private law and the issue of public values therein 
The third field of interest with respect to the evolution and challenge of the 
functional (economic) integration concept is the emerging body of European private 
law. The terminology and the concepts used in the existing model law involving 
European private/contract law which is organised according to a subject-specific-
approach obviously clash with the functional approach aimed at (economic) 
integration. Two aspects are worth mentioning that touch upon the public-private 
distinction in EU law. On the one hand, the lack of a comprehensive European 
private law can be traced to the fact that the allocation of competences has been 
shaped by a different guiding principle and even acts relating to consumer or labour 
protection were adopted on the internal market legal bases which has provoked 
considerable confusion. On the other hand, “public” values have intruded in 
contractual relations that are governed by private law according to the received 
wisdom in market economies. 
3.5.1. Contractual relations and the emergence of a “European private law”  
As mentioned earlier, the term “private” law appears in the Treaties even less 
frequently than its “public” counterpart. Why then at the beginning of the new 
millennium did the Commission start an initiative for a common European Contract 
law (European Commission 2001), which is currently in the process of being 
implemented? The reasons that have been advanced include the persistent 
obstacles to, or hidden potential of, cross-border commercial activities – in 
particular with respect to smaller and medium sized businesses, consumer 
contracts and confidence, financial services and e-commerce. Furthermore, the 
existing piecemeal harmonisation has caused some discontent due to its 
inconsistencies and the constitutional problem of its legal basis, because all major 
contract law directives so far have been enacted on the basis of the internal market 
competence even though consumer protection has been a driving force (Weatherill 
2010). The need for harmonisation is normatively and empirically not 
uncontroversial (Vogenauer and Weatherill 2005; Smits 2006; European 
Commission 2010). The same holds true with respect to the material scope of any 
future common private law. First, some suggest a distinction between business-to-
business contracts and business-to-consumer contracts. Second, it is controversial 
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whether European private law should include only contract law or also related 
liability questions. Third, the discussions have revealed disagreement about 
whether it should include only cross border contracts or all contracts including 
domestic contracts (European Commission 2010). The Commission has presented 
several options for how to apply the existing model law with varying degrees of 
binding character and mandatory force (European Commission 2010) that would 
co-exist with other international instruments of equally varying nature in relation to 
their binding and mandatory character. Recently, the Commission has proposed a 
regulation for an optional sales law (European Commission 2011c). Academic 
scholarship currently considers using the DCFR as a model for the CJEU to interpret 
existing and future EU legislation affecting contract law to be a highly significant 
though controversial function (Whittaker 2009; Vogenauer 2010). So far, the 
opinions of several Advocates General have relied on the various existing 
documents and model laws as non-binding “soft law” documents (AG Trstenjak, 
Case 215/08, Friz, nyr; AG Trstenjak, Case 489/07, Messner [2009] ECR, I-07315, 
para. 85 and para. 94; AG Maduro, Case 412/06, Hamilton [2008] ECR, I-02383, 
para. 24). 
3.5.2. Emerging European private law and the public-private distinction 
There are two aspects that raise important constitutional questions related to the 
public-private distinction. One is the thorny issue of the legal basis for the adoption 
of private law measures, and the second is the increasing influence of what is 
referred to as “social”, “constitutional”, “public” or “political” values in private law. 
As to the competence issue, there is no express general authorisation of the EU to 
operate under the label of “private law”. This is little surprising given that the 
allocation of legislative powers has followed a functional structure aiming at 
(economic) integration and given that the label “private law” has never been 
present. There are, however, various provisions that can be relied on to adopt 
legislation that concerns private law as it is generally understood, such as Article 
169 (2) b TFEU introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht (support, supplement and 
monitor the competence of the Member States in the area of consumer protection), 
Articles 67-81 TFEU on the judicial cooperation in civil matters or the Articles 114 
and 115 TFEU (internal market competence) (Weatherill 2010). Since the early 
days, the competence areas of the EU in fields such as labour protection or 
consumer protection have evolved gradually, even though in most cases the 
respective measures have been displayed as measures linked to market integration. 
With respect to consumer contract law, the internal market competence provisions, 
Article 114 and 115 TFEU, were relied on for all significant legislative measures 
even after the introduction of a genuine consumer competence provision (Article 
169 TFEU, which has only been rarely used) and even though it has been openly 
acknowledged that some of the former directives “disguised the political reality that 
the Member States were committed to the development of an EC consumer policy” 
(Vogenauer and Weatherill 2005).8  
                                                 
8 The legislative acquis in relation to consumer contracts includes the following instruments: Directive 
85/577 (doorstep selling); Directive 90/314 (package travel); Directive 2008/122 replacing 94/47 
(timeshare); Directive 2008/48 replacing 87/102 (consumer credit); Directive 97/7 (distance contracts); 
Directive 2007/64 (payment services in internal market); Directive 2000/31 (electronic commerce); 
Directive 2002/65 (distance marketing of consumer financial services); Directive 93/13 (unfair terms in 
consumer contracts); Directive 99/44 (certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees). See also – again based on Article 115 TFEU – the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on 
consumer rights, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/cons_acquis_en.htm. The proposal merges the 
existing EU consumer directives into one set of rules. At the same time it updates and modernises 
existing consumer rights, bringing them in line with technological change (e-commerce, online auctions) 
and improving provisions particularly in sales negotiated away from physical business premises (e.g. 
door to door selling). For legislative measures relating to commercial contracts: Directive 86/653 (rules 
on self employed commercial agents); Directive 2000/35 (late payment in commercial transactions); 
Directive 2006/123 (services directive).  
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The provisions that served as an entry point for consumer-related aspects into 
harmonisation based on internal market legislation can be found in the current 
Article 114 (3) TFEU: “3. The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 
1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will 
take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new 
development based on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European 
Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this objective”. According to 
the current Article 12 TFEU, introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht, consumer 
protection requirements “shall be taken into account in defining and implementing 
other Union policies and activities”. The complex interaction between the internal 
market rationale and consumer protection are to be viewed in the light of the 
Tobacco Advertising cases of the CJEU and their follow-up cases (Weatherill 2011). 
It was argued that “in so far as Brussels derives its functional competence from the 
goal of establishing an internal market, it enjoys potentially unlimited powers in 
private law subjects” (Caruso 1997). 
The situation has been similar with respect to social policy. As a starting point, 
employment policy relating to macro-economic issues should be severed from 
labour relations and the protection of the workers, which are both more relevant for 
the public-private distinction. Many labour-related directives were adopted upon 
general or more specific legal bases rooted in the internal market, such as the 
current Article 115 TFEU or the Treaty provisions on the free movement of services, 
and are facing the same struggle for their soul between market-building and 
market-correction (Barnard 2011).9 The role of the social partners in legislation 
was strengthened with the introduction of the social policy protocol attached to the 
Treaty of Maastricht.10 Article 9 TFEU, the social policy cross-sector clause, has 
been broadened with regard to its material scope and moved to a more prominent 
place in the TFEU. Social fundamental rights are assuming increased significance for 
promoting solidarity, and yet they await the clarification of their application 
between private parties. The horizontal application of fundamental rights has been 
recognised in some jurisdictions, such as Portugal, Spain and Ireland, but it is 
generally regarded as the exception, an issue which will inevitably need to be 
tackled at the EU level as well (de Witte 2009). The right to strike, laid down in 
Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, may serve as an example that the 
Court has recognised it as a fundamental right (Viking, Laval) without ever fleshing 
out its personal scope. All these achievements demonstrate the enormous potential 
underlying the social aspects. Yet, the social dimension still lacks a comprehensive 
catalogue of precise and enforceable instruments. This dilemma has only been 
overcome with respect to anti-discrimination laws in employment matters, as it will 
be shown below.  
The dilemma of the shaky legal basis, which was due to the economic integration 
paradigm and an overly broad interpreted functionalism, could be considered as 
overcome on two grounds, one linked to the question of legal basis and legislative 
activity and the other to the clarification of the interpretative approach of the Court 
with regard to holistic Treaty interpretation. First, the creation and gradual 
consolidation of several legal bases related to labour and consumer protection and 
anti-discrimination have paved the way for the evolution of EU law in these areas 
grounded in market-independent, self-standing constitutional values. Specific areas 
of private law have been the objects of harmonisation, such as the areas of health 
and safety at work pursuant to Article 153 TFEU or the principle of equal pay for 
                                                 
9 E.g., Directive 75/117 (equal pay); Directive 76/207 (access to employment); both directives have 
been replaced by Directive 2006/54; Directive 75/129 (collective redundancies, now replaced); Directive 
80/987 (insolvency protection) (now replaced by Directive 2008/94); Directive 77/187 (transfer of 
undertakings) and Directive 91/553 (information of workers); Directive 96/71 (posted workers). On the 
struggle to legislate in the social domain, CJEU, Case 84/94, UK v Council, [1996] ECR I-5755 (on legal 
basis of working time directive). 
10 Article 155 (1) TFEU, Directive 96/34 (Parental leave); Directive 97/81 (part time work); Directive 
99/70 (fixed term work). 
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equal work between men and women introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
now set forth in Article 157 (3) TFEU11. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced what 
is currently Article 19 TFEU as a general legal basis allowing for the adoption of 
anti-discrimination measures, which has triggered the adoption of a number of anti-
discrimination directives in employment and elsewhere. These developments 
suggest that fundamental rights, and in particular the equal treatment principle, 
serve to overcome the never-ending controversies concerning the balance between 
market-building and market-correction. 
Secondly, the Court has at least in theory, and derived from holistic Treaty 
interpretation, recognised the co-existence of a plurality of constitutional goals 
including non-market goals (Defrenne II, Viking, Laval) so that the respective legal 
basis in each of the relevant fields in the future can be conceptually uncoupled from 
the functional economic integration paradigm. Theoretically speaking, there would 
no longer be a need to view the benefits of consumer protection or labour 
protection in economic terms. This tendency has been affirmed by the ongoing 
consolidation of the EU’s fundamental rights regime and is being reinforced where 
human rights inspire legislation. On the side of non-market goals and values, a 
category of Trojan horses has assumed growing relevance, namely the (general) 
principles (of EU law) as sources of EU law. Although details have remained opaque 
and controversial, the recognition of several expressions of the equal treatment 
principle has strengthened and extended the protection against discrimination, e.g., 
on grounds of age and sexual orientation (Mangold, Kücükdeveci, Römer).This does 
not mean, however, that their effects do not have to be accommodated within the 
vertical and horizontal allocation of powers. 
What does this picture tell us? Private law or contract law are shallow terms that 
include areas involving labour and consumer protection, which have been 
influenced by public values. Hence, the economic integration paradigm in its pure 
form and the asymmetries with regard to legislative competences appear at best 
reductionist in light of the complexity underpinning the interface between the 
market and intervention. Due to ideological controversies and the lack of a 
comprehensive catalogue of competences at the EU level, internal market 
competence provisions have been used abundantly. This will hopefully no longer be 
necessary in the future given that more specific legal bases are available and that a 
consolidating human rights protection is increasingly serving as a driving force 
behind constitutional norms and legislative measures.  
In addition to the need to render the issue of the legislative basis more transparent, 
another distinct, albeit related, issue remains to be tackled with regard to a 
proposal for a legislative measure concerning contract law, namely the question of 
the interplay between freedom and solidarity in any sort of contract law. The 
original idea of the creation of an academic draft proposal initiated by the 
Commission was supposed to lead one day to its adoption at the legislative level. 
Methodological and substantive details remain highly controversial, not least 
because of ideological battles over how to reconcile freedom and solidarity, which 
cannot be discussed here in detail (Cherednychenko 2007; Ciacchi 2010; 
Brüggemeier, Ciacchi and Comandé 2010). 
One of the thorniest current questions regards the role of the principle of equal 
treatment in contractual relations. Should the principle of equal treatment indeed 
govern contractual relations that are, according to the classical reading, flowing 
from contractual freedom? It has widely been accepted that market failures require 
corrections in order to reach substantive equality between both sides of a contract, 
an issue which reflects the concern of commutative as opposed to distributive 
justice. This view does not obviously herald the instrumentalisation of private law 
by external goals. Things are rendered more complex by bringing in constitutional 
                                                 
11 Directive 76/207 amended by Directive 2002/73 and Directive 2006/54. 
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values such as consumer protection or labour protection if and when they go 
beyond the correction of market failures. The highest degree of complexity is 
reached where specific equality claims on the basis of sex or age are introduced 
and applied not only in unproblematic vertical situations but also in labour 
relationships (Mangold, Kücükdeveci) and, even more extensively, which is 
particularly controversial (e.g. in relation to access to goods and services or in the 
relationship between shareholders in company law (Audiolux). 
Many commentators assume that there is an unwritten principle of equality 
(Tridimas 2006; Besson 2008) that has been concretised in several norms at the 
legislative and constitutional level in the EU.12 The body of equality law is highly 
fragmented and incoherent with respect to the different grounds of discrimination, 
its conceptual approaches as well as its material scope. Discrimination on grounds 
of nationality and all the grounds listed in Article 19 TFEU are prohibited in 
employment and occupation. Only nationality, gender and racial or ethnic 
discrimination to varying degrees are prohibited outside the labour market. 
Whereas the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex as regards equal pay 
between men and women in employment matters has long been recognised as a 
fundamental right (CJEU, Case 149/77, Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365, paras. 26-
29), other specific equality principles have been qualified as fundamental rights 
only recently (Mangold, Kücükdeveci, Römer). This shows that the equality principle 
enjoys a considerable and still growing degree of acceptance that might not be the 
case with respect to other rights. This is so because it meets the requirements of 
generality to the extent that it can be applied in a comprehensive way across 
national legal orders and, arguably, across (many) branches of law alike. The 
equality principle appears to have crossed the public-private divide in EU law in 
areas such as labour law and struggles to gain acceptance in contract or corporate 
law. This particularity vis-à-vis other rights and principles might be due to the 
absence of independent substantive claims and the advantage of its relational, 
access-oriented nature (European Commission 2008b). The creation of conditions 
for the eradication of social exclusion and participation rights, in other words 
equality of opportunity as opposed to the equality of outcome, has become 
increasingly accepted and appears to reflect a “third way” thinking (Barnard 2011). 
What is decisive is the balance between contractual autonomy and intervention in 
contractual relations, which amounts ultimately to a political choice.  
4. Conclusion 
A formally classified public-private distinction has existed in one form or another in 
many civil law countries. A formal separation of the two spheres aims to ensure the 
rule of law and shield the legislature from undue intrusion from the courts. 
However, social and economic changes and subsequent political and legal reactions 
have blurred the distinction over time, demonstrating that law cannot be divorced 
from its social, economic and political context. Conversely, in jurisdictions which 
have not traditionally had a strict and watertight distinction, the divide has become 
more apparent in response to international human rights commitments. This 
justifies assuming a certain convergence across the EU states. The purpose of this 
paper was not to solve EU-level problems, given that they have not yet been solved 
at the national level. Rather, this paper constitutes a modest attempt to clarify 
whether there is indeed a public-private distinction – or an alternative – at the EU 
level. From the outset, market integration has dominated the legal framework of 
                                                 
12 The latter include the following provisions and instruments: Articles 18, 19, 157 TFEU, Articles 20-23 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Directive 2000/43 (equal treatment irrespective of race and ethnic 
origin in employment and beyond (education, supply of goods and services, social advantages)); 
Directive 2000/78 (equal treatment in employment); Directive 2006/54 (equal treatment for men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation); Directive 2004/113 (equal treatment between men 
and women as regards the access to and supply of goods and services); proposal for a directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation, COM (2008) 426 final, 2008/0140. 
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the EU. Under a functionalist construction, integration has been sought to make the 
law instrumental to a given need, in our case, the need to create wealth and 
progress by integrating national economies and, ultimately, political communities. 
Yet, this goal-orientation failed to illuminate the nature of the relationship between 
the actors concerned (Weinrib). Notably, the only set of European rules to govern 
private parties from the outset has been EU competition law. The economic 
integration paradigm was first challenged by the growing significance of non-
market values. Today, EU law urgently needs to accommodate hybrid forms of 
governance which involve both the market and public power, and to accurately 
define the concept of the public interest and the means necessary for its protection. 
Beyond this, the continuing expansion of the material scope of EU law cannot but 
affect the role of its actors and subjects, which has led to a second challenge, 
namely of the public (international economic) law legacy. EU law scholarship and 
legal practice will have to re-conceptualise the role of the individual as being 
concomitantly a subject of the law, a bearer of rights and an addressee of 
obligations with regard to various sources of EU law. Hence, EU law must move 
beyond the image of the individual as simply a tool of law enforcement. For that 
purpose, a distinction appears suitable between on the one hand refining questions 
of the effect of EU law on both vertical and horizontal relationships under national 
law and the determination of the personal scope of various sources of EU law on the 
other. The third challenge results from clashes between the existing acquis and the 
implicit distinctions between public and private law underlying the model laws for a 
common European contract law, which correspond to the public-private divide 
known in civil law countries. The harmonisation of contract law in the EU, its 
constitutional basis, its scope and the role of public values therein are doubtlessly 
delicate and difficult issues. The EU Courts and the legislature seem to be pursuing 
a hidden agenda when grappling with employment and consumer contracts by 
stretching the functionalist and the effet utile argument in the context of the 
horizontal application of primary and secondary law or the choice of the legal basis 
of legislation. By doing so, they side-step an important constitutional dimension of 
this tricky issue. This hardly does justice to the actors involved nor the underlying 
interests at stake. 
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